What is Chains of Reason?
Chains of Reason provides a unique way for anyone to study, present, and contribute to, the chains of reasoning behind particular beliefs - moral, political, scientific, religious, or whatever. Contributors work together on the presentation of each chain, with people left to make their own assessment of its soundness.
See also: What Chains of Reason is, and is not · Why this format? · FAQ · Help

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What is Chains of Reason?

Chains of Reason provides a unique way for anyone to study, present, and contribute to, the chains of reasoning behind particular beliefs - moral, political, scientific, religious, or whatever (see example below). Contributors work together on the presentation of each chain, with people left to make their own assessment of its soundness.

See also: What Chains of Reason is, and is not · Why this format? · FAQ · Help

Example chain

Chain 3: Species can continually evolve by a natural process.


1) There are slight, random variations in hereditary traits among the members of any species of plant or animal.


2) A plant or animal's prospects of surviving and reproducing are affected by the nature of its traits.


3) Of the slight, random variations in hereditary traits among the members of any species of plant or animal, some will be more conducive to survival and reproduction than others.


4) In the competition between members of any species of plant or animal for finite resources and mates, the more conducive an hereditary trait variation is to survival and reproduction the more likely it is to pass into the next generation, and at the expense of those variations of the same trait which are less conducive to survival and reproduction.


5) Of the slight, random variations in hereditary traits among the members of any species of plant or animal, some will tend, in a natural but non-random way, to become increasingly common in the population with each new generation, at the expense of other variations of the same trait.


6) The constant occurrence of slight, random mutations in every generation of any species of plant or animal means that there is a constant supply of new slight, random variations in hereditary traits among the members of each species.


7) The trait profile of any species of plant and animal can continually, gradually and naturally, change over generations as the result of the non-random establishment, and accumulation, in the population of hereditary traits which originated as slight, random variations of other hereditary traits.


8) If the trait profile of a species changes gradually over generations, then that species evolves.


9) Species can continually evolve by a natural process.

Featured topic

A depiction of the Christian god in the Sistine Chapel fresco 'Creation of the Sun and Moon' by Michelangelo.

Religion > The existence of a god or gods

Arguments for and against the existence of a god, or multiple gods, have been proposed by scientists, philosophers, theologians, and others over the centuries.

Newest chains

  • Chain 68: A report of a miracle should never be believed. SUMMARY:
Given that a miracle violates the laws of nature, whereas the false reporting of a miracle (whether intentional or unintentional) does not, the probability that a miracle occurred will always be much less than the probability that the report of the miracle is false, and so such a report should never be believed.
  • Chain 67: There exists a god or multiple gods. SUMMARY:
Given that miracles have occurred, and that only a god could be responsible for their occurrence, there must exist a god or multiple gods.
  • Chain 66: An all-powerful, all-good and all-knowing god could, by performing miracles, prevent natural events which cause human suffering, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, drought and disease. SUMMARY:
An all-powerful, all-good and all-knowing god has the capacity to break even 'unbreakable' laws of nature, by performing miracles, and so such a god could prevent natural events which cause human suffering, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, drought and disease.
  • Chain 65: The existence of unbreakable laws of nature partly resolves the Problem of Evil. SUMMARY:
In a world governed by unbreakable laws of nature, natural events which are in accordance with those laws, but which cause human suffering, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, drought and disease, can occur in the presence of the all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful god, or gods, which created the world, which partly resolves the Problem of Evil.
  • Chain 64: An all-powerful god could have created laws of nature which never lead to natural events which cause human suffering, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, drought and disease. SUMMARY:
The world could have been governed by laws of nature which never lead to natural events which cause human suffering, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, floods, drought and disease, and so an all-powerful god could have created such laws.
  • Chain 63: The proposed all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful god, or gods, which created the world would not have given humans free will. SUMMARY:
A world in which, contrary to this world, humans do not possess free will and are hard-wired to never cause, or fail to prevent, human suffering would be morally preferable to this world, and so no all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful god would have given humans free will.
  • Chain 62: One can possess free will even if one is prevented from actually executing that will. SUMMARY:
To possess free will is to have control over one's will, and one can have control over one's will even if one is prevented from actually executing that will, and so one can possess free will even if one is prevented from actually executing that will.
  • Chain 61: The existence of free will partly resolves the Problem of Evil. SUMMARY:
Humans were given free will by the god, or gods, which created them, which means that they must have the capacity to cause, or fail to prevent, human suffering, without any intervention even by an all-good, all-knowing and all-powerful god, which partly resolves the Problem of Evil. (The Free Will Defence.)
  • Chain 60: A god which is all-good would not have the desire to allow human suffering for its aesthetic value. SUMMARY:
A god which allows human suffering for its aesthetic value is giving such value priority over moral value, which an all-good god would not do, and so a god which is all-good would not have the desire to allow human suffering for its aesthetic value.
  • Chain 59: The contrast between the human joy and human suffering which exists in this world is not a source of beauty. SUMMARY:
A world in which there exists only human joy and no human suffering would be a more beautiful world than one in which there also exists human suffering, and so the contrast between the human joy and human suffering which exists in this world is not a source of beauty.
  • Chain 58: A world without human suffering is morally preferable to this world, in which there is human suffering, even though the former would lack the acts of extreme moral goodness, performed by saints and heroes, that occur in this world. SUMMARY:
The acts of extreme moral goodness, performed by saints and heroes, that occur in this world are only morally desirable because such acts are aimed at reducing human suffering, and so a world without human suffering is morally preferable to this world even though the former would lack saintly and heroic acts.
  • Chain 57: The degree and extent of human suffering in the world could be far less without reducing the amount of saintly or heroic action in the world. SUMMARY:
The degree of human suffering is often far greater than that required for saintly or heroic action to take place, and it is sometimes not possible for human suffering to be relieved by saintly or heroic action, and so the degree and extent of human suffering in the world could be far less without reducing the amount of saintly or heroic action in the world.
  • Chain 56: A god which is all-good would not have the desire to prevent human suffering. SUMMARY:
A world in which there is human suffering, but also acts of extreme moral goodness performed by saints and heroes in response to such suffering, is morally preferable to a world free of human suffering, but therefore also free of any acts of extreme moral goodness performed by saints and heroes, and so a god which is all-good would not have the desire to prevent human suffering.
  • Chain 55: A god is not necessarily the greatest being imaginable. SUMMARY:
A supernatural being could have more goodness, power and knowledge than any other being in existence, and would therefore be considered a god, and yet not be all-good, all-powerful and all-knowing, and therefore not the greatest being imaginable.
  • Chain 54: The Ontological Argument is contradicted by the Problem of Evil. SUMMARY:
The Ontological Argument concludes that there exists a god which is the greatest being imaginable, whereas the Problem of Evil concludes that an all-knowing, all-powerful and all-good god cannot exist, and so the former is contradicted by the latter.
  • Chain 53: The greatest imaginable example of any category of things could still exist even if it does not exist in the universe. SUMMARY:
Heaven could exist, as a separate realm from the universe, and could be a place where the greatest imaginable example of any category of things exists, whereas such things may not exist anywhere in the universe itself, and so such things could still exist even if they do not exist in the universe.
  • Chain 52: The Ontological Argument is unsound. SUMMARY:
An implication of the Ontological Argument is that the greatest imaginable example of any particular category of things must exist, by definition, and yet, putting aside the category of beings, the greatest imaginable example of any particular category of things - from unicorns to chairs - never exists in reality, and so the Ontological Argument must be unsound.
  • Chain 51: A real being is not greater than an imaginary being just because the latter lacks the reality of the former. SUMMARY:
The greatness of a real being relative to an imaginary being is determined by comparing the real traits of the former with the imaginary traits of the latter, but existence is not itself a trait of a real being, but a precondition of that being having real traits, and so a real being is not greater than an imaginary being just because the latter lacks the reality of the former.
  • Chain 50: A god must exist, by definition. SUMMARY:
A real being is greater than an imaginary being, in the sense that the latter lacks the reality of the former, and a god is the greatest being imaginable, by definition, and so a god must exist, by definition. (A version of the Ontological Argument.)
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